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OF PIGEONHOLES AND PROSPECTIVE
JURORS
BILL PArrTt

Perhaps it is stating the obvious to observe that our legal
system relies on the use of language to resolve disputes. Courts
depend upon oral and written representations to arrive at the
truth and to afford justice to those who appear before them. We
would recoil at the suggestion that in this most serious endeavor
the incorrect use of language should be permitted or even encouraged by the courts. Yet, as a result of the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Hernandez v. New York,' the
truth in jury trials may become obfuscated, and people who
know more than one language may be easily precluded from jury
service.
My inclination is to take the traditional approach by reciting
the facts and holding of Hernandez. To some extent I will do
that, but this writing is more than a case brief of Hernandez.
Rather, it is the latest in a series of pleas2 that courts and legislators begin to examine the nature of language itself, and consider
the real interests at stake in attempting to formulate equitable
approaches to language rights cases.
Courts have been unable or unwilling to take this type of
approach because, in general, they have not understood the complex nature of language. Language is obviously a skill, but it is
something more than that. From a sociological-linguistic point of
view, it is more than a neutral tool for the communication of
ideas. It is, instead, at least according to some, a perspective or a
t Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. B.A. 1972, Eastern
New Mexico University; J.D. 1975, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
2. My "pleas" include the following: BILL PIArr, ONLY ENGLISH: LAW AND
LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1990) [hereafter ONLY ENGLISH]; Piatt,
Attorney as Interpreter:A Return to Babble, 20 N.M. L. REv. 1 (1990) [hereafter
Attorney as Interpreter]; Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to
Language, 23 Hous. L. Rlv. 885 (1986) [hereafter Toward Domestic Recognition];
Piatt, Linguistic Diversity on the Airwaves: Spanish Language Broadcastingand the

FCC, 1 LA RAZA L.
ATr, LANGUAGE

RIGHTS (1993).

1001 (1984) [hereafter Spanish Language Broadcasting];PI-
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world view.3 Language shapes the thoughts of its users, and affects people's perception of events and their meaning, not altogether unlike religion.4 It is an inseparable aspect of culture.5
Imposition of language6 represents attempted subordination of
one culture to another.

Yet, despite this complex function of language, when language becomes a factor in judicial or legislative determinations, it
appears under the categories of race or national origin. 7 In the
past, this author has demonstrated the resulting inconsistencies
flowing from the efforts of courts and legislatures to afford remedies when language operates as a barrier to access to legal rights,
such as the right to defend oneself in a criminal prosecution. 8
Similarly, cases involving access to basic human needs such as
education and public assistance programs founder when language issues are raised. 9 Until the advent of a more comprehensive jurisprudence, based upon an analysis of the underlying
interests at stake, courts, legislatures, parties and their attorneys

will be required to follow the traditional approach of examining
cases and applicable laws, applying those that are useful and attempting to distinguish those that are not. The most recent pro3. LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND CULTURE 7 (Paul Hinle ed., 1966).

4. International human rights documents place language in the same protected
category as religion. For example, the United Nations Charter, to which the United
States is a party, identifies one of the purposes of the U.N. to be that of achieving
international cooperation "in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or
religion . . . ." U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para 3.
Moreover, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which concluded in Helsinki on August 1, 1975, resulted in a number of agreements. The
United States participated in the two-year conference and signed, along with many
other countries, the Final Act of the conference. That Act makes reference to a
number of language rights guarantees. Part 1(d)VII of the Act, entitled "Respect
for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms," provides in part: "The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all, without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion." Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1293.
In 1981, Justice Cruz Reynoso of the California Supreme Court, a member of
the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP), wrote in his
dissenting report to a portion of the SCIRP report, "[W]e should no more demand
English-language skills for citizenship than we should demand uniformity of religion." THOMAS ALEINKOFF & DAVID MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLicy 214 (2d ed. 1991).
5. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of S.E. Judicial District, 838 F.2d 1031, 1039
(9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989) ("The primary language not
only conveys certain concepts, but is itself an affirmation of the culture.") (citing
Toward Domestic Recognition, supra note 2, at 894-99).
6. Mary McGroarty, Bilingualism in the Workplace, 511 ANNALS AM. AcAD.
POL. & Soc. Sci. 162 (1990).
7. For a detailed examination of these determinations, see ONLY ENGLISH,
supra note 2, and Toward Domestic Recognition, supra note 2.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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nouncement by the Supreme Court on language issues highlights
the uncertainties which will inevitably flow from forcing language
rights into a narrow pigeonhole, rather than focusing on their impact upon underlying interests.
On May 28, 1991, the Supreme Court announced its opinion
in Hernandez. The case involved a New York'criminal trial
where the prosecutor had used peremptory challenges to exclude
two Latino, potential jurors who were bilingual. They were
stricken, according to the prosecutor, because they had looked
away from the prosecutor and had hesitated before responding
affirmatively to the prosecutor's inquiry whether they would accept a translator as the final arbiter of some witness's responses,
which were going to be given in Spanish and translated into English. Previous Supreme Court decisions10 and a federal statute"
make it unlawful to remove jurors from a criminal prosecution
on the basis of race. In fact, in Powers v. Ohio,'2 an opinion
handed down less than two months prior to its Hernandez decision, the Court found that a white defendant was denied equal
protection where African-Americans were excluded from the
jury.13 Justice Kennedy wrote, as part of the majority opinion,
that "racial discrimination in the qualification or selection of jurors offends the dignity of persons and the integrity of the
courts.' 4 With the exception of voting, he concluded, "for most
citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most signifi5
cant opportunity to participate in the democratic process.'
Justice Kennedy also wrote the majority opinion in Hernandez. He noted, with apparent approval and citing noted sociology and linguistic experts, the complex function of language:
Language permits an individual to express both a personal
identity and membership in a community, and those who share
a common language may interact in ways more intimate than
those without this bond. Bilinguals, in a sense, inhabit two
communities and serve to bring them closer. Indeed, some
scholarly comment suggests that people proficient in two languages may not at times think in one language to the exclusion
of the other. The analogy is that of a high-hurdler, who combines the ability to spring and to jump to accomplish a third
feat with characteristics of its own, rather than two separate
functions. Grosjean, The Bilingualas a Competent but Specific

Speaker-Hearer, 6 J. Multilingual & Multicultural Develop10.
(1991).
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364
18 U.S.C. § 243 (1948).
Il S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
Id. at 1364.
Id.at 1366.
i& at 1369.

CHICANO-LATINO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:61

ment 467 (1985). This is not to say that the cognitive processes
and reactions of those who speak two languages are susceptible of easy generalization, for even the term "bilingual" does
not describe a uniform category. It is a simple word for a
more complex phenomenon with many distinct categories and
subdivisioqs. Sanchez, Our Linguistic and Social Context, in
SPANsH iN

=H UNITED STATES

9, 12 (J. Amastae & Elias-

Olivares 1982); Dodson, Second LanguageAcquisition and Bilingual Development: A Theoretical Framework, 6 J. Multilingual & Multicultural Development 325, 326-327 (1985).16

Then, in this author's opinion, the Supreme Court halted
what appeared to be the first steps at identifying the real issues at
stake. It did not consider the extraordinary thing being asked of
bilingual jurors: that if they hear words in Spanish which bring
some images to mind, they must somehow forget those images
and thoughts, and accept only the images and thoughts raised by
the English language version offered by the court interpreter.
Because the Court did not consider the extraordinary request being made, it made the conclusion that the delay in responding
justified the jurors' removal. If the Court had understood the
nature of the request, it might have concluded that hesitancy
would be the only honest reaction from a layperson asked to put
aside his/her first images and version of reality in absolute favor
of a second, potentially inaccurate rendition. 17 The Court might
have focused on the importance of the honor and privilege of
jury duty for bilingual citizens and of the integrity of the courts,
in accordance with its Powers decision. It might have considered
the fact that if all attorneys, witnesses, and other jurors are
monolingual, the only person in the courtroom who would know
18
if a translation error had occurred would be a bilingual juror.
Yet such a juror, after Hernandez, apparently would be required
to ignore the error. In fact, he or she would never even have the
chance to serve as a juror unless he or she unhesitatingly promised not to reveal any translation errors to the court.' 9 Instead of
focusing on the real interests of guaranteeing that the truth
16. 111 S. Ct. at 1872.
17. Consider an individual who has learned from infancy to associate the word
"madre" with the female adult who gave him or her birth. If that person is called to
court as a juror and told by an incompetent translator that "madre" means "cloud"
or some other word, that juror will not be able to stop the neurological processes
that first brought the image of "mother" to mind. For courts to suggest that human
beings can consciously purge themselves of that image is absurd.
18. See Attorney as Interpreter,supra note 2.
19. Footnote 3 of the opinion in Hernandez illustrates the removal of a bilingual
juror who may very well have made a good faith effort to point out a translation
error. 111 S. Ct. at 1866 n.3. Later in the opinion, the Court observed, "though
petitioner did not suggest the alternative to the trial court here, Spanish-speaking
jurors could be permitted to advise the judge in a discreet way of any concerns with
the translation during the course of trial." Id at 1868.
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prevails in trials and that bilingual citizens participate in our democracy as jurors, the Court upheld Hernandez's conviction and
the decision to exclude the bilingual jurors.
The Court determined that it need not address the argument
that Spanish-speaking ability bears such a close relation to
ethnicity that exercising a peremptory challenge on the basis of
language was a violation of the equal protection clause, because
the prosecutor had explained that the jurors' specific responses
and their demeanor, and not their language proficiency alone,
caused him to doubt their ability to defer to the official translation.20 The Court noted that the lower court could have relied on
the fact that the prosecutor defended his use of peremptory challenges without being asked to do so by the judge, that he did not
know which jurors were Latinos, and that the ethnicity of the
victims and the prosecution witnesses (Latinos) tended to undercut any motive to exclude Latinos from the jury.21 However, the
Court noted that it might be, for certain ethnic groups in some
communities, that proficiency in a particular language like skin
color should be treated as a surrogate for race under equal protection analysis.2 Can discrimination on the basis of language be
considered national origin discrimination or racial discrimination? The Supreme Court's answer is that it may be, depending
upon the circumstances. The better inquiry would have been to
determine the effect on the dignity of individuals and the integrity of the courts given the virtually automatic exclusion of bilingual jurors this case could produce, regardless of the ethnicity of
victims and witnesses, and whether there could be a showing of
intentional racial discrimination on the part of the prosecutor.
Of course, all is not lost with Hernandez. After all, the
Court did take some important steps in identifying some sociological-linguistic perspectives on language. Further, zealous defense counsel can always attempt to rehabilitate the hesitating
prospective bilingual juror by asking questions designed to elicit
responses which show that the juror will follow the court's instructions and interpreters, and will attempt to inform the court if
a serious error in translation has been made. The juror could
also be asked to explain any hesitancy which might have occurred in response to a prosecutor's query concerning acceptance
of an interpretor's translation. Perhaps the juror has never been
in court before, does not understand the interpreting process and
is hesitating, not out of reluctance to do what is required, but
because of his or her unfamiliarity coupled with the extraordi20. Id. at 1867-68.
21. Id. at 1872.

22. Id.
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nary nature of the request. Defense counsel should educate the
court as well. The court should be made to understand the difficulty of the interpreting process under the best of circumstances,23 and the benefits of utilizing a juror's bilingual skills to
assist in the truth-finding process. Also, as explicitly set out in
Hernandez, a prosecutor's persistence in the desire to exclude
Spanish-speakers, despite the alternative of asking them to agree
to discreet advisement of the trial judge regarding interpreting
errors, can be taken into account by the court in determining
24
whether to accept a race-neutral explanation by the prosecutor.
This process, if successful, might cure the Hernandez problem, but it does not resolve larger concerns. The connection between language and race or national origin has acquired so much
inertia in so many areas of the law that immediate change is unlikely. Further, until the change occurs, this author would not
recommend removing the limited, and arguably analytically unsound, protection that these statutes and decisions afford. However, legislatures and courts should begin rethinking these issues
and try to identify the real issues at stake.
We are an increasingly multilingual society. We need the
talents and resources of all of our people. It is morally unjust,
economically inefficient, and logically unsound to maintain
archaic legal approaches to contemporary law and language concerns 25 This is particularly urgent in the rendition of justice,
where the truth may be sacrificed to ignorance, by the unreasonable demand that bilinguals, in effect, quit being bilingual if they
wish to serve- on a jury.

23. See generally SusAN BERK-SELIGSON, Tm BILINGUAL COURTROOM (1990);
Attorney as Interpreter,supra note 2.
24. 111 S. Ct. at 1868.
25. See generally ONLY ENGUSH, supra note 2; Attorney as Interpreter,supra
note 2; Toward Domestic Recognition, supranote 2; Spanish Language Broadcasting,
supra note 2.

